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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KARENGOLAY,e?a/., : 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, : Case No. 20030528-CA 
v. : 
WASHINGTON CITY CORPORATION, : 
Defendants and Appellees, : 
WHEELER MACHINERY CO. : 
Intervenor. 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Utah Supreme Court poured this case over to the Utah Court of 
Appeals on August 27, 2003. The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to 
§78-2-2(4), Utah Code Ann. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES/STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Was mailed notice to the public, including Plaintiffs/Appellants (the 
"Citizens"), of the Washington City Planning Commission (the "Commission") 
hearing on a conditional use permit for Intervenor, Wheeler Machinery Company, 
("Wheeler") required? (R. 182-184.) This issue is a matter of law for which 
this Court grants no deference to the determinations of the District Court. 
Springville Citizens, et al. v. City of Springville, et al., 1999 UT 25, ^31. 
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2. Are the Citizens barred from appealing the illegal actions of the Planning 
Commission by the doctrine of "exhaustion" because they didn't appeal a 
decision that they didn't know about? (R. 181-182.) This issue is a matter of 
law for which this Court grants no deference to the determinations of the District 
Court. Springville Citizens, et al v. City ofSpringville, et al, 1999 UT 25, f 31. 
3. Is the controversy in this case still justiciable, or is it moot? (See 
Wheeler's Memorandum in Support of Suggestion of Mootness filed with the 
Supreme Court.) This issue is a matter of law which was only raised at the 
appellate level, so there is no determination by the District Court for the Court 
of Appeals to review, and it is therefore a question of law. Springville Citizens, 
et al v. City ofSpringville, et al, 1999 UT 25, ^ [31. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All of the determinative statutory provisions are quoted in the Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In or around April, 2001, Wheeler acquired certain property within 
Washington City (the "City") in order to construct and operate a commercial 
facility from which to sell, rent and service construction and earth-moving 
machinery and equipment. (R. 52.) In or around August, 2001, Wheeler applied 
to the City for a permit to construct and operate the facility as a conditional use in 
the zoning district where the property was located. (R. 52.) On September 11, 
2001 the Commission held a public meeting and approved the conditional use 
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permit ("CUP") with certain further conditions. (R. 52-53.) On September 20, 
2001, certain neighboring property owners requested a re-hearing of the 
Commission's decision because not all neighbors received the notice and because 
the Commission did not make requisite evidentiary findings. (R. 53.) 
The Commission held the second hearing on November 7, 2001, and denied 
Wheeler's CUP. (R. 53, 70.) On November 13, 2001, Wheeler appealed that 
decision to the City Council (the "Council"). (R. 70.) The Council held a public 
meeting on January 9, 2002, and affirmed the Commission's denial. (R. 53-54, 
71.) On January 11, 2002, Wheeler filed suit in the Fifth District Court, Civil No. 
020500091, asking the Court to overturn the denial of the CUP (the "First 
Action"). (R. 54.) On August 12, 2002 the Court in the First Action issued a 
"Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment" in Wheeler's favor requiring the City 
to grant the CUP (the "First Ruling"). (R. 86-104.) 
Pursuant to the First Ruling the Commission again considered Wheeler's 
CUP on September 4, 2002 (the "Commission Hearing"). (R. 71, 126.) The 
record of the proceedings (the "Record") contains a Notice that was posted the day 
prior to the September 4, 2002, hearing. (R. 71-72.) However the zoning 
ordinances of the City (the "Ordinances") requires that "[njotice .. . shall be 
mailed to all property owners . . . within a 300 foot radius of any property for 
which an action of the Planning Commission is being requested," Chapter 8, § 8-3. 
(R. 126.) 
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Beyond any dispute, there was no notice of the Commission Hearing 
mailed to the residents within a 300 foot radius, including the Citizens, of 
Wheeler's property as required by the Ordinance. (R. 126, 136-137.) The 
Citizens had no knowledge of the Commission Hearing and thus didn't attend. (R. 
126-127, 136-137.) Pursuant to the First Ruling, the Commission approved 
Wheeler's use with the imposition of certain conditions that were different than 
any previously recommended (the "Commission Decision"). (R. 165.) 
Because the Citizens didn't know of the Commission Hearing or the 
Commission Decision the Citizens did not appeal the Commission Decision to the 
Council as they would have been entitled pursuant to the Ordinances. (R. 165.) 
The Council would have heard comments from the Citizens at the appeal of the 
Commission Decision and the Council could have imposed materially different 
conditions on Wheeler's proposed use than those adopted by the Commission 
Decision. (R. 166-167.) 
On September 20, 2002 certain individuals (including many of the Citizens 
in this action) filed a Motion to Intervene and a Motion to Reconsider Summary 
Judgment in the First Action. (R. 165.) On November 5, 2002 the Motion to 
Intervene in the First Action was denied on the grounds that it was untimely, 
having been filed more than 30 days after the judgment was entered in the First 
Action, and finding no grounds to set aside that judgment under Rule 60(b), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 118-122.) 
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Suspecting that their efforts to resuscitate the First Action might be 
unsuccessful, on October 3,2002, within thirty days of the Commission Decision, 
the Citizens filed this action. (R. 2-3, and 165.) Wheeler was granted leave to 
intervene. (R. 40.) The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment based 
on the record before the City. (R. 48-49.) The District Court heard argument, 
reviewed the record, and ruled from the bench granting the motions of Wheeler 
and the City and denying the motion of the Citizens. (R. 177.) That decision was 
memorialized in a Ruling and an Order both dated May 13, 2003 and both filed on 
May 19,2003. (R. 175-185.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and this Court on the issue of a 
municipality's failure to follow its own rules and the consequences, or lack 
thereof, for such failure is less than clear to practitioners in this important area of 
local government law. In Springville Citizens, et al v. City of Springville, et al, 
1999 UT 25, f 30, the Supreme Court declared that a city is "not entitled to 
disregard its mandatory ordinances." In Bradley, et al v. Pay son City 
Corporation, 2003 UT 16, ^[23, the Court appeared to say that the rule in 
Springville is only true for legislative land use decisions, and the rule would not be 
applied in other "types of municipal land use decisions." Following the 
conflicting messages in these two cases, citizens and others involved in land use 
matters before local government bodies are unclear whether the local governments 
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have to follow their own rules and, if they do not, whether there are any available 
remedies. 
The City and Wheeler argue that the notice Ordinances can be ignored on a 
"no harm no foul" basis. However, the notice ordinance must be followed in order 
for citizens in the City to have the right to appeal decisions of the Commission to 
the Council. In this case, it is apparent that if the Citizens had been afforded 
notice of the Commission's pending determination they would have appealed to 
the Council seeking different conditions of approval for Wheeler's CUP. 
After this appeal was filed Wheeler asserted that the outcome of this appeal 
was moot. Wheeler's Suggestion of Mootness makes the creative, albeit 
unprecedented, argument that because it has completed its facility the land it sits 
on is no longer vacant so the Court should ignore the fact that the land wasn't 
vacant at the time the Commission wrongfully approved Wheeler's project. A 
decision in this case will make a difference in the real world, and affect the rights 
of the litigants, so this controversy is not moot. If this Court reverses the District 
Court and remands this matter back to the City the Citizens can argue to the 




THE CITY FAILED TO FOLLOW ITS 
OWN RULES REGARDING NOTICE 
AND SHOULD BE REQUIRED 
TO DO SO 
It is undisputed that no notice of the Commission Hearing was mailed to 
the neighboring property owners, including the Citizens, as required by the 
Ordinances. That failure is grounds for remand pursuant to Springville Citizens, et 
al v. City ofSpringville, et al., 1999 UT 25, f31. The City and Wheeler claim that 
the Citizens were not prejudiced by this lack of notice because the "administrative 
record" before the Commission was supposedly "closed" prior to the Commission 
Hearing. However, nothing in the Ordinances nor the First Ruling compels that 
conclusion. 
The plain language of the Ordinance conclusively establishes the Citizen's 
claim. "Notice of Planning Commission meetings1 shall be mailed to all property 
owners . . . within a 300 foot radius of any property for which an action of the 
Planning Commission is being requested." Washington City Zoning Ordinance, 
Chapter 8, §8-3 (emphasis added).2 There is nothing in the Ordinance that 
distinguishes if the Commission will be hearing from the public, or not as to 
whether the public is entitled to notice. The Ordinance merely requires that if the 
1
 Note that the Ordinances do not require notice for only public "hearings" but, 
instead, for the much more broad term of "meetings". 
2
 §3-6 of the Washington City Ordinances (regarding meetings of the Commission) 
also has the exact same language regarding and requiring notice. 
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Commission will be taking action on a matter that effects property owners within 
300 feet of the subject of the Commission decision, property owners must be 
mailed a notice of the meeting. There is no question that during the September 4, 
2002, meeting the Commission was going to take action on the Wheeler CUP. 
The Commission had been ordered to take action granting the CUP. Therefore, 
and ineluctably, those property owners within 300 feet of Wheeler's property were 
entitled to have been mailed notice of the Commission's hearing. 
Moreover, even if the record concerning the CUP application had been 
closed, the Citizens could have asked the Commission at the Commission Hearing 
to reopen the record to hear testimony regarding what conditions to impose on the 
CUP. As the First Ruling makes clear, the vast bulk, if not the totality, of the 
record in the First Action was related to whether the CUP should be allowed at all 
and not to what conditions should be imposed if the use were allowed. Further, 
even if the record had been closed before the Commission Hearing, the Citizens 
would have had the requisite notice and the ability to appeal the Commission 
decision to the Council. The Citizens could have argued from the Commission 
record on an appeal to the Council for different conditions on Wheeler's use.3 
3
 The Citizens could also have contacted the Commission and Council members 
before the meeting to voice their concerns. After all, at this point Wheeler's CUP 
had been denied, so the Citizens had not had an opportunity to voice their comments 
to the legislative body regarding what restrictions should be placed on Wheeler if the 
CUP was granted. See, e.g. Bradley, et al v. Payson City Corporation at ^ 28, citing 
Harmon City v. Draper City, 2000 UTApp 31 at ^ 26. 
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POINT II 
THE CITIZENS DID NOT FAIL TO 
EXHAUST THEIR 
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES 
As noted in Point I, above, if the Citizen's had known of the Commission 
Hearing and the Commission Decision they could have appealed to the Council 
within the ten days specified in the Ordinances. This short time clock is likely one 
reason why the City has a mandatory notice ordinance to be used in their CUP 
approval process. 
It is more than ironic that the City ignored its own rules about mailed notice 
but now claims that the Citizen's didn't exhaust their administrative remedies by 
failing to appeal a decision they didn't know of. The applicability of the ten-day 
appeal rule outlined in §8-6 of the City Ordinances, and the appeal process 
detailed in the state code at §10-9-407(2), U.C.A., providing administrative 
remedies that should be exhausted before filing suit are logically contingent upon 
having had notice of the action from which an appeal would be taken. 
POINT III 
THE CITIZENS5 CLAIMS ARE 
NOT MOOT 
Wheeler's argument for the mootness of this case is creative but strange. It 
follows in sum: since we have completed construction of our building, and now 
the land our facility sits on is no longer vacant, our use is now a permitted use 
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instead of a conditional one. There is absolutely no state statutory law to support 
this argument. Nor do the City's own Ordinances support this conclusion. 
Furthermore, Wheeler cites no case law to support its claim that during this 
appeal the use of the property has somehow morphed from a conditional use to a 
permitted use, and clearly, this is not the case. Wheeler was granted a CUP, with a 
number of conditions, on September 4, 2002. Wheeler developed its vacant piece 
of land, and just because the building is complete, Wheeler is not suddenly entitled 
to claim that it has a permitted use. The CUP granted by the City and the 
conditions attached thereto are still in full force and effect, and the Citizens merely 
want to be afforded the opportunity to seek additional restrictions on that CUP. 
Wheeler cites one case in its Memorandum, Burkett v. Schwendiman, 773 
P.2d 42, 44 (Utah 1989). However, unlike in Burkett, the judicial relief requested 
in this case can affect the rights of the Citizens. In Burkett, the municipality in 
question amended its Ordinances making the case unnecessary. Here the City has 
not changed the conditional use ordinance since the beginning of this litigation. 
The same Ordinance is still on the books. 
If this Court reverses the District Court and remands this matter back to the 
City the Citizens can argue there for different conditions on Wheeler's CUP, such 
as restrictions on the hours of operation, noise limitations, etc. The Citizens have 
the right to voice their opinions to the Council, City Ordinance, §8-6, and the 
Council might impose some conditions that are necessary to protect the Citizens. 
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Even if this Court finds that the Citizens case is moot, this Court should 
still render a decision for other parties that might be affected by the City's 
Ordinances. Interested persons will be regularly affected by the City's 
interpretation of the plain language of §8-3 of its Ordinances. 
The Ordinance states, "fnjotice of Planning Commission meetings shall be 
mailed to all property owners . . . within a 300 foot radius of any property for 
which an action of the Planning Commission is being requested'" Washington 
City Zoning Ordinance, Chapter 8, §8-3 (emphasis added). In the case at bar, that 
notice did not take place, and City denied the Citizens the "basic procedural right" 
of notice and due process. Carroll et al v. President and Commissioners of 
Princess Anne etaL, 393 U.S. 175, 184 (1968). 
The Court should decide this matter, even if it determines the case at bar is 
moot, based on the public importance exception. The Supreme Court of Utah 
defines the public importance exception to the mootness doctrine as follows: 
The public interest exception to the mootness doctrine 
arises 'when the case presents an issue that affects the 
public interest, is likely to recur, and because of the 
brief time that any one litigant is affected, is capable of 
evading review.'4 Because mootness is a matter of 
judicial policy, the ultimate determination of whether 
to address an issue that is technically moot rests in the 
decision of the court. Mootness is not solely a judicial 
4
 In this case, if the Court agrees with Wheeler that since construction is complete 
their use is now permitted instead of conditional, then other parties could face a 
similar problem. Any Mure party that applied for a CUP could circumvent the 
notice requirements, have a CUP granted, quickly complete construction in order to 
escape review and claim "too bad, now we are a permitted use and you have no 
recourse" in the Courts. 
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doctrine, but is founded in part on policy 
considerations . . . the question of mootness is one of 
convenience and judicial discretion. 
Ellis v. Swensen, 2000 UT 101, }^26 (citations omitted). Similarly, 
this Court has said that "[w]hether an appellate court 'reaches the 
merits of a mooted issue in any particular case rest within [the 
court's] discretion.'" State of Utah v. Fife, 911 P.2d 989, 991 (Utah 
App. 1996) (citation omitted). 
One reason the City Ordinance requires mandatory notice to appropriate 
property owners is so that when the Commission is going to make a decision 
property owners have notice of that decision so they can appeal to the Council if 
they disagree. When decisions take place over multiple meetings, property owners 
need to have notice of each meeting so when a final decision is rendered they are 
not thwarted from their right to appeal, which is on a very short clock (ten working 
days) in the City. Since many municipalities in Utah likely have a similar notice 
requirement, the Court should decide the "question of law presented which might 
serve to guide the municipal body when again called to act in the matter." 
Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission et aL, 219 
U.S. 498, 516 (1911). 
CONCLUSION 
The City's failure to give the Citizens notice of the Commission Hearing 
violated the City's own Ordinance. This violation, in turn, prevented the Citizens 
from appealing the Commission Decision to the Council which could have 
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imposed materially different conditions on Wheeler's CUP. The issues in this 
case have not been mooted by Wheeler's completion of its building. The City 
Council can still impose conditions on the CUP beyond those now in effect. The 
Citizens' are entitled to have the decision of the Commission overturned. 
DATED this J _ day of April, 2004. 
BAIRD & JONES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
fee R. Baird 
^ 
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I 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following statutes are determinative of the issues presented by this appeal. 
§10-9-103(l)(c) and (2), U.C.A.: 
(l)(c) "Conditional use" means a land use that, because of its 
unique characteristics or potential impact on the municipality, 
surrounding neighbors, or adjacent land uses, may not be 
compatible in some areas or may be compatible only if 
certain conditions are required that mitigate or eliminate the 
detrimental impacts. 
(2)(a) A municipality meets the requirements of reasonable 
notice required by this chapter if it: 
(i) posts notice of the hearing or meeting in at least three 
public places within the jurisdiction and publishes notice of 
the hearing or meeting in a newspaper of general circulation 
in the jurisdiction, if one is available; or 
(ii) gives actual notice of the hearing or meeting. 
(b) A municipal legislative body may enact an ordinance 
establishing stricter notice requirements than those required 
by this Subsection (2). 
(c)(i) Proof that one of the two forms of notice authorized by 
this Subsection (2) was given is prima facie evidence that 
notice was properly given. 
Emphasis added. 
$10-9-407. U.C.A.: 
(1) A zoning ordinance may contain provisions for 
conditional uses that may be allowed, allowed with 
conditions, or denied in designated zoning districts, based on 
compliance with standards and criteria set forth in the zoning 
ordinance for those uses. 
(2) The board of adjustments has jurisdiction to decide 
appeals of the approval or denial of conditional use permits 
unless the legislative body has enacted an ordinance 
designating the legislative body or another body as the 




(2) The board of adjustment shall hear and decide appeals 
from planning commission decisions regarding conditional 
use permits unless the zoning ordinance designates the 
legislative body or another body to hear conditional use 
permit appeals. 
§10-9-708(1), (3)(a), and (7)(a), U.C.A.: 
(1) Any person adversely affected by any decision of a board 
of adjustment may petition the district court for a review of 
the decision. 
(3)(a) The petition is barred unless it is filed within 30 days 
after the board of adjustment's decision is final. 
(7)(a) The filing of a petition does not stay the decision of the 
board of adjustment. 
§10-9-1001(1), (2)(a), and (3) U.C.A.: 
(1) No person may challenge in district court a municipality's 
land use decisions made under this chapter or under the 
regulation made under authority of this chapter until that 
person has exhausted his administrative remedies. 
(2)(a) Any person adversely affected by any decision made 
in the exercise of or in violation of the provisions of this 
chapter may file a petition for review of the decision with the 
district court within 30 days after the local decision is 
rendered. 
(3) The courts shall: (a) presume that land use decisions and 
regulations are valid; and (b) determine only whether or not 
the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal 
Emphasis added. 
Ill 
Washington City Zoning Ordinance §3-6: 
The Planning Commission shall conduct regularly scheduled 
meetings which shall be properly advertised and open to the 
public. Notice of Planning Commission meetings shall be 
mailed to all property owners appearing on the latest 
ownership plat in the Washington County Recorders Office 
within a 300 foot radius of any property for which an action 
of the Planning Commission is being requested. It shall be 
the responsibility of the applicant for such action to provide 
the stamped, addressed envelopes necessary to provide such 
notice. All other costs involved with processing Planning 
Commission applications shall be the responsibility of the 
party or parties making such application. 
Emphasis added. 
Washington City Zoning Ordinance §8-3: 
Application for a Conditional Use Permit shall be made by 
the property owner of a certified agent thereof at the 
Washington City Office on forms provided for that purpose 
twenty (2) working days prior to the regularly scheduled 
meeting of the Planning Commission at which the application 
is to be considered. Notice of Planning Commission meetings 
shall be mailed to all property owners appearing on the latest 
ownership plat in the Washington County Recorders Office 
within a 300 foot radius of any property for which an action 
of the Planning Commission is being requested. It shall be 
the responsibility of the applicant for such action to provide 




Washington City Zoning Ordinance §8-6: 
Any person shall have the right to appeal to the Washington 
City Council any decision rendered by the Planning 
Commission in relation to Conditional Use Permit decisions. 
Appeals to the City Council are made by filing, in writing, the 
reasons for the appeals to the City Council within ten (10) 
working days following the date upon which the decision is 
made by the Planning Commission. After receiving said 
appeal, the City Council may reaffirm the Planning 
Commission decision or set a date for a public hearing. 
(1) The City Council shall notify the Planning Commission of 
the date of said hearing at least seven (7) days preceding the 
date set for such hearing so that the Planning Commission 
may prepare to [sic] record for said hearing. (2) The City 
Council after proper review of the decision of the 
Commission and application of the standards listed in Section 
8-5 above, may affirm, reverse, alter or remand any action 
taken by the Planning Commission. 
Emphasis added. 
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